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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
AND THE VIRTUES OF INDEPENDENCE
DIANE P. WOOD*

When I think of Justice Blackmun, for whom I had the privilege of
serving as a law clerk during October Term 1976, I recall many
admirable personal qualities: his integrity, his loyalty, his tenaciousness,
his quiet sense of humor, and the scrupulous care that he brought to
virtually every aspect of his job. These were qualities that had typified
his approach to each position he had held in his long and distinguished
career: practicing lawyer, counsel to the Mayo Clinic, and court of
appeals judge. However, in some ways the most impressive quality to me
was one uniquely critical to a judicial position: his independence of
thought, and his refusal to fit any particular stereotype that the outside
world tried to impose upon him. This independence explains a great
deal about the positions he took on the Court, and those he refused to
take.
The task of documenting the Justice's long career on the bench is
one that deserves a book, not a brief memoir. However, using several
examples from October Term 1976-which will always be the Court
Term I know the best-I can illustrate the ways in which that
independence manifested itself over the course of one year. It will also
be apparent why a clerkship with Justice Blackmun was such a rewarding
yet demanding experience: there were never any easy answers, never
any knee-jerk reactions, and never any short-cuts. Instead, what my coclerks and I saw was meticulous attention to the facts of each case, an
openness to the arguments that all parties brought before the Court, and
an effort in every single case to synthesize both the facts and the law so
that the soundest conclusion could emerge.
The first example I would like to cite is Castaneda v. Partida,l
which raised the question whether discrimination in the grand jury
selection process tainted a state conviction. Although the case had not
been well briefed by the State, one of the points that the State had raised
was its "governing majority" theory: since the overwhelming majority
of the population and elected officials of the locality in question were all
* Diane P. Wood clerked for Justice Blackmun during October Term 1976. She is presently
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and is
on leave from her position as the Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal
Studies at The University of Chicago Law School. The views expressed here are entirely personal
and do not necessarily represent the position of the Department of Justice.
1. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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Hispanic, it should be impossible as a matter of law to show
discrimination against Hispanics. Whatever the superficial appeal of this
theory might have been, Justice Blackmun did not stop his inquiry there.
In the opinion he wrote for the Court, he took two approaches that
proved to be complementary. First, following a traditional common-law
style of reasoning, he compared the facts in Castaneda to those of many
earlier cases involving jury discrimination problems, and he found that
the degree of exclusion of Hispanics before him had been condemned in
those earlier decisions. Second, in a footnote, the Justice (who had been
an honors mathematics student as an undergraduate) subjected the data
to a statistical analysis, and showed that the chances of producing grand
juries with so few Hispanics in the absence of a conscious decision to
exclude them were tiny. His care in probing the reality that lay behind
the facts was typical: he neither assumed that discrimination was taking
place, nor that it could not take place. Nothing but a full appreciation of
the facts and their meaning would do.
A second decision, Smith v. United States ,2 showed the same kind of
concern about the entire context of a case. Smith involved the question
whether mailing obscene materials in a state .that allegedly would not
have penalized their possession was an offense, and it also involved the
question whether the jury should always judge the issue of obscenity
under the Miller v. California3 standard, if state legislation appeared to
provide a more objective standard. The Court held that sending obscene
materials through the mail was a separate federal offense, regardless of
the particulars of the state law, and that the issue of obscenity was always
for the jury. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court is interesting
because it begins by cataloging exactly what kinds of materials Smith
was responsible for sending through the mails. Context mattered to him,
and it did not matter whether the end result was something that outsiders
might regard as "liberal" or as "conservative."
The Justice may have taken his concern with the specifics to a fault
in Wolman v. Walter,4 which involved the ever-troublesome question of
the extent to which state aid to parochial schools comes into conflict with
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Justice Blackmun
subscribed neither to the "absolute wall" approach, nor to the
"nondiscrimination for or against religion" approach, but instead he
tried scrupulously to follow the middle ground that the Court's cases
had outlined. This led to constitutional decisions about the difference

2. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
3. 414 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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between putting a map up in the front of a classroom (aid to the school,
which was impermissible) and distributing individual maps to desks (aid
to the students, which was permissible), and a host of similar efforts at
line-drawing.
Naturally, over the course of an entire Term of Court there were
myriad decisions that had to be made-on petitions for certiorari, votes
on argued cases, decisions to join the opinions of other Justices or to
write separately, and approaches to adopt in authored opinions.
Looking only at October Term 1976, I defy anyone to label the
category into which Justice Blackmun fit. In the area of criminal law, he
had just voted that the death penalty is not necessarily unconstitutional,
in the group of cases known as Gregg v. Georgia et al. 5 (The reason that
he later changed this view at the very end of his career was also typical:
he had tried and tried to find some principled way to handle these cases,
and had finally concluded it could not be done.) His opinion in U.S.
Trust Company v. New Jersey6 breathed new life back into the Contract
Clause of the Constitution, and helped to set in motion an entirely new
way of thinking about the freedom with which state and local
governments can regulate, and who should bear the costs of such
regulations.
At the same time, his opinions in cases like Maher v. Roe,7 and
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,8 demonstrated his abiding concern for
individual freedom in the most intimate of life's decisions. These are
the views which ultimately earned him a spot on the "left wing" of the
Court in his later years there. It is worth noting, however, that he
remained quite consistent in his positions on questions of criminal
procedure throughout his tenure on the Court. He appreciated the
difficulties faced by the line police officers, and he was adamantly
opposed to the imposition of unrealistic technical rules whose breach
would then trigger the application of the exclusionary rule.
Independence taken to the extreme could be confused with
unpredictability, but as I have written elsewhere, this would not be a fair
characterization of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence. 9 In fact, I believe
that his views of the appropriate role of the Supreme Court, the
appropriate role of the federal government and its various branches, and
the appropriate role of government more generally in our society
warrant much more study. At the risk of overgeneralization and
5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
7. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
8. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
9. See Diane P. Wood, Justice Blackmnun and Individual Rights, 97 DICK. L. REv. 421 (1993).
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premature conclusions, I will suggest that he gave great scope to
government in the area of public safety and social order; his views of the
regulatory state gave primacy to the legislative branch of government;
and the autonomy of the individual was sacred to him-at least as long
as the person was not inflicting negative externalities on those around
her or him.
I could not have suggested this at any point during the year I
worked for the Justice, and he himself appears to have developed his
jurisprudence more inductively than deductively. This, however, to me
was and is the hallmark of a judge in the truest sense of the word:
someone who was unfailingly fair and courteous to the litigants before
him, who insisted on being fully informed about the facts and the law
that applied to the case, and who allowed his views of the law to develop
carefully, step-by-step, with respect for the Constitution and the laws he
was sworn to uphold, and attention to the ever-changing factual patterns
presented by a complex world.

